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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEWIS F. HANSEN, 
d.b.a. HANSEN REALTY CO., 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
vs. 
IVY B. SNELL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9169 
BRIEF OF APPELL~T 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ivy B. Snell, defendant and appellant, prosecutes this 
appeal from a judgment rendered against her in favor of 
plaintiff and respondent for a commission claimed to have 
been contracted for and earned by plaintiff and respondent 
growing out of an alleged agreement to pay a commission 
because of an effort by plaintiff to sell some property belonging 
to defendant and appellant. 
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In the main, there is no conflict in the evidence. In our view 
the case should have been disposed of as a matter of law upon 
the pleadings. However, in order that the Court may have 
before it the evidence which may be deemed material, we shall 
give a brief summary thereof. 
On August 19, 1958, defendant and appellant executed 
and delivered to plaintiff and respondent what is designated 
as an Apartment Listing on one side and as a Sales Agency 
Contract on the other. Exhibit 1-P. On the side designated 
as Apartment Listing is some printed matter and some hand-
writing. Following the printed word "Price" are the figures 
in writing "$43,000" folowed in printing "cash," which in 
turn are followed in writing by the words "Terms to suit 
Seller." The writing on Exhibit 1-P is that of plaintiff and 
respondent, except the signature of Mrs. Snell, defendant and 
appellant. It was so testified to by plaintiff and respondent 
(R. 23). 
On the side of Exhibit 1-P, designated as Sales Agency ,,, 
Contract, appears this language. Some words are scratched 
out at the top of the page and the words "Hansen Realty" 
written in. The document then reads: 
"In consideration of your agreement to list the property 
described on the reverse side of this contract with the 
Multiple Listing Bureau of Salt Lake Real Estate Board 
(these words have a line drawn through them as in- · 
dicated.) during the life hereof, and to use your efforts 
to find a purchaser therefor, I hereby grant you for the 
period of six months from date hereof, the exclusive 
right to sell or exchange said property or any part 
thereof, at the price and terms stated hereon, or at 
6 
·.,. 
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such other price, terms or exchange to which I may 
agree. 
During the life of this contract, if you find a buyer 
who is ready, able and willing to buy said property 
or any part thereof at said price and terms, or any other 
price or terms to which I may agree in writing, or if I 
agree to an exchange of said property or any part 
thereof, or if said property or any part thereof is sold 
or exchanged during said term by myself or any other 
person, firm or corporation, I agree to pay you the Salt 
Lake Real Esta,te Board commission on such sale or 
exchange, or if it is sold or exchanged within three 
months after such expiration to any person to whom 
you or any member of the Mupltiple Listing Bureau 
of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board have previously 
offered it, I agree to pay you the commission above 
stated; and in case of the employment of an attorney to 
enforce any of the terms of this agreement, I agree to 
pay a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of col-
·lection." 
On cross examination ~Ir. Hansen further testified, over 
objection of his Counsel, that he had list~d the property last 
year for $37,500.00, but was unable to sell it at that price; 
that if she could get $43,000.00 cash that would take care of 
the income tax (R. 24). That Mrs. Snell never refused to sell 
the property on terms to suit her. That witness could not get 
terms to suit her (R. 25). That witness showed Mrs. Snell 
and her husband another place to help them make up their 
minds; that he told Mrs. Snell she could remain in the house 
where she was living a reasonable time (R. 26). That witness 
does not recall receiving a copy of Exhibit A, which is attached 
to the Answer, but he knew about it, and that Mrs. Snell had 
made the offer contained therein (R. 27). That Bennetts 
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would not accept the offer; they said they would accept it at 
six per cent, or any per cent, but would not accept it at ten 
per cent; that Bennetts said they would pay cash; that witness 
does not recall that any offer was made except for cash (R. 
29) . That witness did not get the consent of Mrs. Snell to 
deposit the $1000.00 to her account (R. 30). That Mr. Nelson 
brought the $1000.00 to witness and asked him to place the 
credit of Mrs. Snell, and gave Mrs. Snell the deposit slip; 
that he did know that Mrs. Snell refused to accept the money, 
and that the same was returned to Bennett Motor Company 
(R. 31). 
On redirect examination Mr. Hansen testified that Mrs. 
Snell never told him that she would not sell the property for 
cash; that he told her that $43,000.00 was above market and 
that she could pay her income taxes (R. 32). 
At the conclusion of the testimony of Mr. Hansen his 
attorney stated that he would not contend that Mr. Hansen 
had made a filing with the County Clerk showing that he was 
doing business. Counsel for plaintiff in the court below, re-
spondent here, further stated that "the file contains the plead-
ings and evidence of the appearance we have made, and we 
wish to submit the matter of attorney's fees on that evidence" 
(R. 33). 
Mrs. Snell, defendant and appellant, testified in part as 
follows: 
That when Mr. Hansen brought the listing to her she 
asked him as to how the listing obligated her, to which Mr. 
Hansen replied that "It's nothing. It's just to have a record 
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for our files. You have nothing to worry about. I'll protect 
you." That nothing was said at that time with respect to the 
payment of income taxes (R. 34). That she had never refused 
to sell the property on the terms alleged in her answer. She 
testified that she received the letter marked Exhibit 7 (R. 35). 
It will be noted in that letter signed by Jos. S. Nelson 
it is in substance there stated that Bennett Motor Company 
rejects the offer of Mrs. Snell to sell the property under the 
terms contained in her letter of January 28, 1959. In that letter 
a tender was made of the remainder of $43,000.00. 
On cross examination Mrs. Snell testified that she had 
known Mr. Hansen for about twelve years; that Mr. Hansen 
has made possibly two sales of property for her (R. 36). That 
the property here involved was listed with Mr. Hansen in 1957 
and 1958; that in 1957 Mr. Hansen told witness that he was 
offered $35,000.00 cash for the property; that she would not 
sell the property for cash; that her only income was from 
rental of the property and she would not sell for cash (R. 3 7). 
Some of this answer was stricken, but the record does not 
show just what was stricken. That witness did not discuss the 
matter of whether she would accept $35,000.00 for the prop-
erty (R. 38). That she informed Mr. Hansen in August, 1958, 
that she wished to sell her property (R. 39). That she told 
Hansen that Bennetts were anxious to buy the property, and 
that Mr. Hansen was her friend, and h{( should probably have 
the sale. That Mr. Bird had contacted witness about the sale 
of the property to Bennett Motor (R. 40) . That Mr. Bird 
had contacted witness before she signed the listing to Mr. 
Hansen (R. 41). That she informed Mr. Hansen that Bennett 
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Motor was interested in the purchase of the rear part of the 
property, but that Mr. McDermott was not mentioned (R. 42). 
That witness remembers seeing Exhibit 10, which is signed 
by Bennett Motor Company; that Mr. Hansen brought a con-
tract that Bennetts and McDermott would buy the property; 
that witness was interested in selling the whole property, and 
did not know how it was to be divided by McDermott and 
Bennett Motor (R. 44). That when he brought the contract 
he asked witness what terms she would accept, and she told 
Mr. Hansen to give her time; that she does not recall of ever 
asking Mr. Hansen to relieve her from the listing of the . 
property (R. 45) . That witness told Mr. Hansen that she 
wanted a home to live in before she sold her property (R. 47). 
That witness considered the purchase of a duplex; that Mr. 
Hansen brought a number of contracts to her to sign, but she 
did not sign any of them (R. 48) . Witness knew that Bennetts 
wanted to buy the property for cash; that she told Mr. Hansen 
she would not sell the property for cash (R. 49) . That witness 
must have a down payment and a monthly payment until the 
property is paid for; that the ·original offer was for a down 
payment of $5000.00 (R. 50). That the only offer witness made 
was the one prepared by Judge Hansen; that the offer was 
for 8%, if the buyer will assume the payment of the commis-
sion, and the monthly payment reduced to $350.00; that 
witness's attorney mailed the offer; that witness did not state 
her terms until she employed Judge Hansen (R. 52). 
On redirect examination Mrs. Snell testified that Mr. 
Hansen never told her that he had deposited a thousand dollars 
to her credit; that she never told him to do that (R. 54). That 
the thousand dollars did not remain to her credit; that she 
10 
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refused to accept the credit; that witness never refused to sell 
the property to Bennett Motor Company (R. 55). 
Plaintiff below, respondent here, was recalled and in 
substance testified: That he had alisting of the property here 
involved in about 1957 (R. 57). That he had a dozen con-
versations with Mrs. Snell about an offer to purchase the 
property in 1957 (R. 58). Mr. Hansen was permitted to answer 
over objection of Counsel for Mrs. Snell about a conversation 
had with Mrs. Snell in 1957. Such testimony so admitted was 
to the effect that Mrs. Snell would not state what amounts 
she would take for the property less than the listed price 
(R. 60). 
Counsel for plaintiff, over objection of Counsel for de-
fendant, was permitted to examine witness Hansen about 
Exhibits 9 and 10 (R. 63). Mr. Hansen was again permitted 
to testify about showing houses and property to Mrs. Snell 
(R. 64) . Mr. Hansen further testified that Mrs. Snell told 
him that she wanted to sell because negroes were moving near 
by (R. 66). That at the time of the listing nothing of Im-
portance was said (R. 67). 
Mrs. Ruth C. Hansen, wife of plaintiff, was called as a 
witness, but she was not permitted to testify to anything 
which will be of aid in this controversy. Her testimony will 
be found in the record of pages 69 to 71. 
Ben C. Rich testified that he is in the real estate business; 
that he is acquainted with Lewis F. Hansen, and has met Mrs. 
Ivy B. Snell on one occasion (R. 71). That he met Mrs. Snell 
when he delivered the offer to buy her property for cash. That 
Mr. Hansen, Mr. McDermott, Mrs. Hansen or Mrs. Snell 
11 
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and her husband and witness was present at her home at the 
time (R. 73). Over objection by defendant's Counsel, Mr. 
Rich was permitted to testify that Mrs. Snell stated she decided 
she didn't want to sell the property, and that witness stated 
to Mrs. Snell that she had already sold her property. "We've 
accepted your offer. Now you can name the terms, and we'll 
conform to it, within reason." Mrs. Snell replied that "I don't 
believe anybody can make me sell my property, if I don't want 
to." That witness was aware of the listing of the property in 
the year 1957 (R. 74). That Mrs. Snell refused to sign arty 
of the documents that .Mr. Bird had (R. 76). That when 
witness said we had accepted her offer, witness meant himself 
and Mr. Hansen; that Mrs. Snell was told that she could have 
either all cash or terms that were satisfactory to her (R. 77). 
That witness did not know about the final offer she had made; 
that witness did not know what terms he thought might be 
satisfactory to her; that she_ said she had changed her mind 
and didn't want to sell her property (R. 78). 
Mr. Hansen was again recalled and identified Exhibits 
12 and 13, the former was admitted, the latter rejected (R. 
80-81). 
Mrs. Snell was recalled on rebuttal and denied that she 
had ever stated that she refused to sell the property here in-
volved (R. 83). 
It is further made to appear that Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 were 
received in evidence at the time of the Pre-trial; Exhibit 5 was 
also received in evidence (R. 84). It will be noted that in 
Exhibit 2-P it shows that under date of November 14th Bruce 
J. McDermott and Bennett Motor Company state that they 
12 
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accepted the offer of Mrs. Snell to sell the property here in-
volved for "Price $43,000.00 cash. Terms to Suit Seller." 
At the time of preparing appellant's Brief there cannot 
be found the Exhibits that were received in evidence at the 
Pre-trial. 
In our opinion much of the evidence which we have 
summarized should have been rejected, but we shall not discuss 
that phase of the case because in our view the pleadings viewed 
in the light of the evidence received present only questions of 
law. 
Following are the Points upon which appellant relies for 
a reversal. 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING 
THAT PLAINTIFF MAY MAINTAIN THIS ACTION FOR 
ACOMMISSION NOTWITHSTANDING HE HAS FAILED 
TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953, 42-2-1 (R. 89). 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING THAT 
PART OF FINDING NO.2 WHEREIN IT WAS FOUND 
THAT BY THE LISTING HERE INVOLVED DEFEND-
ANT COVENANTED "TO PAY TO PLAINTIFF 5% OF 
THE SALE PRICE AS A BROKER'S COMMISSION IF 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD FIND A PURCHASER READY, 
WILLING AND ABLE TO BUY SAID PROPERTY AT 
SAID PRICE" (R. 87). 
13 
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POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
ING NO. 5 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE BUYER 
CONTINUED TO BE READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO 
BUY SAID· PROPERTY ON REASONABLE "TERMS TO 
SUIT SELLER" (R. 88) . 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
ING NO.8 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE INTEREST 
RATE NOT BEING SPECIFIED, THE INTEREST RATE 
SHOULD BE 6% PER ANNUM (R. 88). 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING NO. 9 
WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT IN EITHER EVENT THE 
INTEREST RATE SHOULD BE 6% PER ANNUM ON 
THE UNPAID BALANCE (R. 88) . 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING NO. 
10 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF'S BUYER 
IS READY AND WILLING TO BUY SAID PROPERTY 
ON THE TERMS STATED BY DEFENDANT WITH 6% 
INTEREST (R. 88). 
14 
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POINT SEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT ASSENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT FIX-
ING THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE 
ALLOWED PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY (R. 89). 
POINT EIGHT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CON-
CLUSION OF LAW NUMBERED 1 WHEREIN IT CON-
CLUDED THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 42-2-1, U.C.A., 1953, FROM 
MAINTAINING THIS ACTION. 
POINT NINE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING IS CON-
CLUSION OF LAW NO. 2 WHEREIN IT CONCLUDED 
THAT PLAINTIFF HAS FOUND A BUYER WILLING 
TO PAY INTEREST AT 6% PER ANNUM ON THE UN-
pAID BALANCE (R. 89). 
POINT TEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CON-
CLUSION OF LAW NO.4 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION OF 5% 
ON $43,000.00, OR $2,150.00 (R. 89). 
15 
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POINT ELEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT 
UPOI'.J THE GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILS 
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON WHICH RELIEF 
CAN BE GRANTED, IN THAT, PLAINTIFF ALLEGES 
AND DEFENDANT ADMITS THAT DEFENDANT DID 
NOT AND HAS NOT REFUSED TO PERFORM, AND IS 
STILL NEGOTIATING WITH SAID PURCHASER TO 
PURCHASE SAID PROPERTY, (R. 1 AND R. 7), AND 
THAT, THEREFORE, THE BRINGING OF THE ACTION 
WAS PREMATURE. 
POINT TWELVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE ALLEGATIONS CON-
TAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 4, 5, 6, 7 AND THAT PART 
OF PARAGRAPH 11, OF DEFENDANT'S AMENDED 
ANSWER WHEREIN IT IS ALLEGED THAT "PLAINTIFF 
HAS IN THE :NIANNER ABOVE ALLEGED BEEN REP-
RESENTING THE PROPOSED PURCHASER." 
ARGUMNT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING 
THAT PLAINTIFF MAY MAINTAIN THIS ACTION FOR 
A COMMISSION NOTWITHSTANDING HE HAS FAILED 
TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953, 42-2-1 (R. 89). 
16 
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It is provided by U.C.A. 1953, 42-2-1, that: 
"No person or persons shall carry on or conduct or 
transact business in this state under an assumed name 
or under any designation, name or style, corporate, 
partnership or otherwise, other than the real name or 
names of the individual or individuals conducting or 
transacting such business unless such person or persons 
shall file in the. office of the County Clerk of the 
county in which the principal place of business is or is 
to be located, an affidavit setting forth the name under 
which such business is or is to be conducted or trans-
acted, and the full name or names of the person or 
persons owing, conducting or transacting the same, 
the location of the principal place of business with 
the post office address or addresses of such person or 
persons. Such affidavit shall be executed by the person 
or persons so conducting or intending to conduct such 
business." 
Section 42-2-2, provides for an index to be kept by the 
County Clerk, who shall collect a fee of $1.00 f.or his service. 
Section 42-2-4 provides that any person who "fails to com-
ply with the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a misde-
meanor. 
There have been numerous adjudications by courts of last 
resort construing statutes similar to the Utah statute above 
quoted. The only Utah cases we are able to find dealing with 
the construction of the Utah statute are: Putnam v. Industrial 
Comm., 80 Utah 187, 208, 14 Pac. (2d) 973, and Christensen_ 
v. Johnson, 90 Utah 273, 61 Pac. (2d) 597. In the former case 
it is held that the purpose of the statute is to give notice to 
the public as to the name or names of persons conducting the 
business. In the latter case it is held that when the defense 
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failed to set up non-compliance with the statute on appeal 
to the District Court, such defense is waived. The statute is 
clearly intended as a measure to regulate business and not 
a revenue measure. The only charge for filing the required 
affidavit is $1.00. The law announced by this Court and the 
courts generally is to the effect that when the purpose of an 
act is to regulate business and not as a revenue measure and 
make the failure to comply with the act a crime, the courts 
refuse to permit the person failing to comply with such act 
the right to enforce contracts made without a compliance with 
the act. Andersen v. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 Pac. (2d) 725. 
It is said in 12 Am. fur., Sec. 163, page 658, that a dis-
tinction has been frequently recognized between statutes de-
signed for the protection of the public and those designed 
for the raising of revenue. It appears that all the courts agree 
that where a statute was enacted to protect the public against 
fraud or imposition or to safeguard the public health or morals, 
an agreement in violation thereof is ordinary void." Numer-
ous cases are cited in footnote 12 in support of the text. In 12 
Am. fur., Sec. 161, page 656, the law is stated thus: 
"In order that there may be an implied prohibition 
the imposition of a penalty is not essential. In other 
words, it is not necessary that a statute should impose 
a penalty for doing or omitting to do something in 
order to make void a contract which is opposed to its 
operation. The observe of this proposition is, however, 
the basis of awell-established rule, which originated 
at least as early as the time of Lord Holt. The rule, 
as stated in the early decisions, is that every agreement 
made by or about a matter or thing which is prohibited 
and made unlawful by any statute is void, though the 
statute itself doth not mention that it shall be so, but 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only inflicts a penalty on the offender, because a penalty 
implies a prohibition though there are no prohibitory 
words in the statute . . . Lord Holt's remark is an 
authority for the proposition that an agreement made 
in direct violation of a statute providing a penalty for 
the violation thereof is illegal though the contract is 
not in express terms prohibitive or pronounced void." 
It will be seen that numerous cases are cited under note 9 in 
support of the text. We have examined a number of the cases 
there cited, and the same support the law announced in the 
text. 
To the same effect is the law announced in 65 C.J.S.J Sec. 
9 (b), page 14, et seq. See also: 38 Am. fur., 603, and 45 
A.L.R. 216, where cases are cited from Indiana, Michigan, 
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Texas, holding 
that a failure to comply with a statute similar to the Utah 
statute prevents the person so failing from bringing an action 
to enforce a contract made without complying with said law. 
It will be seen from a reading of the foregoing citations that 
there is an apparent conflict in the adjudicated cases. However, 
a number of cases which permit an action to be brought by 
one not complying with a statute somewhat similar to the Utah 
statute are readily distinguishable from the U~tah statute. 
Thus some of the statutes provide that one who does business 
under an assumed name must file a verified statement con-
taining his true name. Under such a statute it is held in some 
of the cases that if the surname is used, the one so using his 
surname need not file the required statement. It will be seen 
that our statute expressly provides that the statement which is 
required to be filed with the County Clerk must contain the 
full name or names of the person or persons owning, conduct-
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ing or transacting the same and the principal place of business 
of the one conducting the business. The plaintiff in this case 
having failed to comply with U.C.A. 1953, 42-2-1 oi the Utah 
statutes should not be permitted to maintain this action (R. 89). 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING THAT 
PART OF FINDING NO. 2 WHEREIN IT WAS FOUND 
THAT BY THE LISTING HERE INVOLVED DEFEND-
ANT COVENANTED "TO PAY TO PLAINTIFF 5% OF 
THE SALE PRICE AS A BROKER'S COMMISSION IF 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD FIND A PURCHASER READY, 
WILLING AND ABLE TO BUY SAID PROPERTY AT 
SAID PRICE" (R. 87). 
The only provision in the listing is "I agree to pay you 
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board commission on such sale or 
exchange." It is not clear as to whether the commission should 
be paid to plaintiff or to the Real Estate Board, or whether 
the word "you" refers to plaintiff or to the Salt Lake Real 
Estate Board. The difficulty, however, lies much deeper. There 
is not one word of evidence as to what commission is fixed 
or charged by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board. U.C.A. 1953, 
78-25-1, contains provisions as to what the Court may judicially 
know. The commission that the Salt Lake Real Estate Board 
charges is not one of those matters. It will also be observed 
that defendant denies that she is owing plaintiff any commis-
sion (R. 87). 
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l 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
ING NO. 5 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE BUYER 
CONTINUED TO BE READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO 
BUY SAID PROPERTY ON REASONABLE "TERMS TO 
SUIT SELLER'' (R. 88) . 
The evidence in this case shows that the prospective 
purchaser at all times prior to the commencement of this 
action insisted on purchasing the property here involved for 
cash. At no time did they, or either of them, make any offer 
to purchase the property on an installment basis. However, in 
one of the communications the prospective purchaser did say 
that they would accept the offer to purchase the property "on 
terms to suit the seller." Bennett Motor Company gave to 
the plaintiff one thousand dollars to place to the credit of de-
fendant in her bank. This was evidently done in order to trick 
defendant into a position where she agreed to accept cash. 
When plaintiff and a :Nlr. Rich, who represented one of the 
purchasers, called on defendant, they, according to the testi-
mony of Mr. Rich, insisted that Mrs. Snell had sold her prop-
erty (R. 74 and 77). It is true that Mrs. Snell delayed for 
some time before making up her mind as to the terms she was 
willing to 'accept. Her husband was seriously ill at the time, 
and later passed away (R. 45) . 
It will be seen from defendant's Amended Answer that 
on January 26, 1959, she made known the terms that she was 
willing to accept (R. 9, Exhib,it A). There is no evidence 
which shows or tends to show that defendant was not willing 
to accept such terms up to and at the time of the trial. The 
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Court found that such offer was made (R. 88, paragraph 6). 
Plaintiff contended in the court below, and apparently the 
Trial Court found, that the terms therein were either unrea-
sonable or not within the terms of the agreement. The terms 
that Mrs. Snell stated she would accept are: $5000.00 in cash, 
and the unpaid balance to be paid in installments of $400.00 
per month, with interest at 10% per annum, if Mrs. Snell is 
to pay the commission, and if Mrs. Snell is not to pay a com-
mission, by installments of $350.00 per month, with interest 
at 8% per annum. The earned interest shall first be paid and 
the balance to be applied on the principal. The amount not 
paid to be secured either by a mortgage on the property sold 
or on other property of equal value. See Exhibit A attached to 
the Amended Answer (R. 9) . In making the offer, Mrs. Snell 
stated that she did not 'admit that she was obligated to pay 
a commission. 
It will be seen that throughout the negotiations for the 
sale of listed property plaintiff did all he could to aid the 
prospective purchaser by attempting to trick defendant into a 
position where she was bound to accept cash for the property. 
Having failed to accomplish that end, he brought this action 
with the apparent purpose of causing defendant to believe 
that she must pay a real estate commission even though she 
was unable to secure a deal on "terms to suit the seller." 
It is alleged in the Complaint and admitted in the Amended 
Answer that "defendant has not refused to perform and is 
still negotiating with the said purchaser," etc. Under the listing 
Mrs. Snell did not agree to pay a commission for securing a 
prospective purchaser who merely engaged in negotiating for 
the purchase of the listed property. 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The interest which Mrs. Snell exacted on the unpaid prin-
cipal is within the amount which the Legislature has ordained 
are proper charges. The law of Utah expressly permits a 
charge of interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum. U.C.A. 
1953, 15-1-2, for the loan or forbearance· of any money, goods 
or things in action. The Legislature having so provided, it · 
would seem idle to contend that such a charge of interest is 
unreasonable. When plaintiff secured .the signature of Mrs. 
Snell to the listing he must have known that she retained the 
right to state that the terms which suited her would call for 
payment with interest on all deferred payments to carry interest 
at 10% per annum. If he did not wish to undertake to secure 
a buyer who was willing to accept such terms, it was up to 
him to make other provisions in the listing when he prepared 
the same. It is fair to assume that plaintiff was well aware 
of the fact that many sellers of property are unwilling to 
accept a payment so large that it will cast an immediate obli-
gation upon the seller to pay the entire income tax on the 
profit made. So also is it fair to assume that one who sells 
property which is to be paid Jor at a substantial time in the 
future is taking a great risk that the value of money will 
further depreciate in value before the payment is made. The 
magazines, the press, the radio and television are full of such 
predictions. Moreover, there are many buyers who are willing 
and anxious to buy property on the installment plan with pay-
ments extended over a long period of time. Plaintiff in the 
court below, respondent here, may not be heard to say that 
he was not aware that defendant had a right to say that the.. 
"terms to suit the seller" were the terms submitted by her. 
Before plaintiff has any cause of action against defendant he 
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is required to produce such a purchaser. He has not done so, 
but on the contrary, has devoted his energies in an attempt 
to get defendant to accept terms to suit a prospective purchaser. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL' COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
ING NO.8 WHEREIN" IT FOUND THAT THE INTEREST 
RATE NOT BEING SPECIFIED, THE INTEREST RATE 
SHOULD BE 6% PER ANNUM (R. 88). 
It is a well-established law that a contract must be con-
strued most strongly against the one who draws the contract. 
12 Am. fur., Sec. 252, page 795, and cases there cited. The 
written part of the listing is in the handwriting of plaintiff 
and respondent, except the signature of Mrs. Snell (R. 23). 
It is also well settled that effect must be given when possible 
to every sentence, phrase and word contained in a written 
contract. 12 Am. fur., Sec. 241, page 772, et seq., and cases 
there cited. Among such cases. are: Vitagraph v. American 
Theatre Co., 77 Utah 71, 291 Pac. 303; Anderson v. Great 
Eastern Casualty Co., 51 Utah 78, 168 Pac. 966; Smith v. 
Bowman, 32 Utah 33, 88 Pac. 687. 
If, as is provided in the listing, the terms of the sale 
should be satisfactory to the seller, to say that such language 
meant that only 6% may be charged on deferred payments, 
is to ignore the plain meaning of the language. The words 
"terms to suit the seller" apply to the payment of interest on 
deferred payments as well as to the amount and time of the 
installment payments. In the case of Blackburn v. Bozo, 82 
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Utah 556, 26 Pac. (2d) 543, the Court cited with approval 
the following meaning of the word "terms" as used in a 
contract of listing property for sale by a broker: 
"The true meaning of the provision 'turns on a 
definition of the word terms which is said in 38 Cyc. 
184' in its plural forms, in its restricted and legal sense 
and as used chiefly in reference to contracts to signify 
the conditions, limitations and propositions which com-
prise and govern the acts which the contracting parties 
agree expressly or impliedly to do or not to do; con-
ditions, propositions stated or made which when as-
sented to or accepted by another settles the contract 
and bind the parties." 
The same thought is thus expressed in Biack' s Law Dic-
tionary, 2nd Ed. 1146, in this language: 
"In law of contracts and in court practice the word 
(terms) is generally used in the plural and terms are 
conditions, propositions stated or promises made when 
assented to or accepted by another, settle the contract 
and bind the parties." 
We are unable to find a case and doubt that one can be found 
where the use of the word "terms" in a contract means that 
the interest rate on. deferred payments shall be 6% per annum. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING NO.9 
WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT IN EITHER EVENT THE 
INTEREST RATE SHOULD BE 6% PER ANNUM ON 
THE UNPAID BALANCE (R. 88) . 
We adopt what is said under Point Four in support of 
this Point Five (R. 88). 
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POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING NO. 
10 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF'S BUYER 
IS READY AND WILLING TO BUY SAID PROPERTY 
ON THE TERMS STATED BY DEFE~DANT WITH 6% 
INTEREST (R. 88). 
If plaintiff's buyer was ready or willing to buy the property 
on terms stated by defendant with 6% interest, they kept such 
willingness a profound secret. The Court will look in vain in 
the pleadings or the evidence in support of such finding. As 
will be seen from the evidence the prospective purchaser 
insisted on paying the full purchase price in cash. In this con-
nection, the attention of the Court is directed to the law 
which holds that by plaintiff's insistency that defendant accept 
a cash payment of $43,000.00, the prospective purchaser 
rejected . all offers that defendant might make upon terms to 
suit her unless such offer was for cash. When an offer is 
made to sell property and such offer is not accepted, but a 
different counter offer is made, such counter offer is in law a 
rejection of the first offer. 17 C.J.S., Sec. 403, page 381, et seq., 
and cases there cited in footnotes. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
DEFENDANT ASSENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT FIX-
ING THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE 
ALLOWED PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY (R. 89). 
There is an absence of any evidence to support the above 
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attacked Finding, and likewise there is no evidence of any 
agreement as to the payment of attorney's fee, or as to the 
reasonable value thereof. What occurred with respect to 
attorney's fee appears on page 33 of the record where Counsel 
for plaintiff stated "that the file contains the pleadings, and 
evidence of appearance we have made, and we wish to submit 
the matter of attorney's fees on that evidence." However, as 
no attorney fee was allowed, this Finding is not prejudicial 
and we will not discuss this phase of the case in this Brief. 
POINT EIGHT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CON-
CLUSION OF LAW NUMBERED 1 WHEREIN IT CON-
CLUDED THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 42-2-1, U.C.A., 1953, FROM 
MAINTAINING THIS ACTION. 
We adopt what is said under Point One in support of 
this Point. 
POINT NINE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING IS CON-
CLUSION OF LAW NO. 2 WHEREIN IT CONCLUDED 
THAT PLAINTIFF HAS FOUND A BUYER WILLING 
TO PAY INTEREST AT 6% PER ANNUM ON THE UN-
PAID BALANCE (R. 89). 
Appellant adopts what is said under Points Four and Six 
in support of this Point (R. 89) . 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT TEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CON-
CLUSION OF LAW NO.4 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION OF 5% 
ON $43,000.00, OR $2,150.00 (R. 89). 
Appellant adopts what is said under Point Two in support 
of this Point (R. 89) . 
POINT ELEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT 
UPON THE GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILS 
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON WHICH RELIEF 
CAN BE GRANTED, IN THAT, PLAINTIFF ALLEGES 
AND DEFENDANT ADMITS THAT DEFENDANT DID 
NOT AND HAS NOT REFUSED TO PERFORM, AND IS 
STILL NEGOTIATING WITH SAID PURCHASER TO 
PURCHASE SAID PROPERTY, (R. 1 AND R. 7), AND 
THAT, THEREFORE, THE BRINGING OF THE ACTION 
WAS PREMATURE. 
Little need be added to what has already been said in 
support of this Point.· It is, of course, elementary that a cause 
of action must depend on the facts as they exist at the time 
the action is commenced. All that is alleged in the Complaint 
is that plaintiff had been successful in getting prospective 
purchasers to negotiate with defendant for the purchase and 
sale of the listed property. No one could then tell whether 
such negotiations would result in a sale. It may well be that 
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r 
if plaintiff had not brought this untimely action, the parties 
would have been able to agree upon terms that suited the seller. 
POINT TWELVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE ALLEGATIONS CON-
TAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 4, 5, 6, 7 AND THAT PART 
OF PARAGRAPH 11, OF DEFENDANT'S AMENDED 
ANSWER WHEREIN IT IS ALLEGED THAT ''PLAINTIFF 
HAS IN THE MANNER ABOVE ALLEGED BEEN REP-
RESENTING THE PROPOSED PURCHASER." 
It has been repeatedly and uniformly held by this Court 
that in cases tried before the Court without a jury the Court 
must find on all material issues which .find support in the 
evidence. Among such cases are Thomas v. Farrell} 82 U. 535, 
26 Pac. (2d) 328; Cleverly v. District Court} 85 Utah 440, 39 
Pac. (2d) 748. It is equally settled that it is the duty of an 
agent to faithfully serve his principals. That a real estate broker 
may not serve both seller and buyer without their consent. 
For the reasons stated appellant prays that the judgment 
appealed from be reversed and that the Court below be directed 
to dismiss plaintiff's alleged cause of action, and that appellant 
be awarded her costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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